Chapter 2: Trusts and Estates by Slizewski, Emil
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law
Volume 1966 Article 5
1-1-1966
Chapter 2: Trusts and Estates
Emil Slizewski
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml
Part of the Estates and Trusts Commons
Recommended Citation
Slizewski, Emil (1966) "Chapter 2: Trusts and Estates," Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law: Vol. 1966, Article 5.
CHAPTER 2 
Trusts and Estates 
EMIL SLIZEWSKI 
§2.1. Wills: Specific bequest. Under Massachusetts law the classi-
fication of a bequest of stock as general or specific is essential before 
it can be determined whether additional shares resulting from a stock 
split after execution of the will shall pass to the legatee.1 A bequest of 
a specified number of shares of stock is ordinarily deemed to be gen-
eral.2 Yet, in the recent case of Igoe v. Darby,S legacies were held to be 
specific when the number of shares bequeathed corresponded exactly 
with the number of shares owned by the testatrix at the date of execu-
tion of the will. The Court also placed emphasis on the "odd" num-
ber of shares involved - 76 - which were given in three separate 
legacies of 25, 25, and 26 shares. There was also the added significant 
feature that each bequest of stock was coupled with a further legacy 
which was obviously specific. 
During the 1966 SURVEY year the Supreme Judicial Court in a 
rescript opinion, Lavin v. LeRoe,4 applied the principles stated in 
Igoe v. Darby to find a legacy of stock to be specific. The testatrix, 
owning 40 shares of American Telephone and Telegraph Company 
stock when she executed her will, bequeathed 40 shares of American 
Telephone and Telegraph Company stock by definite unequal num-
bers in eight separate bequests. Because the legacies were ruled specific, 
additional shares resulting from a stock split after execution of the 
will but before the testatrix's death passed to the specific legatees. 
The only significant factors common to both Igoe and Lavin appear 
to be that both cases were concerned with an "odd" number of shares 
- 76 and 40 - and the sum of the shares bequeathed equalled the 
number of shares owned at the time of execution of the will. If the 
76 shares in Igoe and the 40 shares in Lavin were bequeathed to one 
instead of several beneficiaries, the bequests should still be considered 
EMIL SUZEWSKI is Professor of Law at Boston College Law School and a member 
of the Massachusetts Bar. 
§2.1. 1 McGuinness v. Bates, 345 Mass. 632, 189 N.E.2d 212 (1963), 1963 Ann. 
Surv. Mass. Law §2.1; Igoe v. Darby, 343 Mass. 145, 177 N.E.2d 676 (1961), 1962 
Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §2.1. 
2 McGuinness v. Bates, 345 Mass. 632, 189 N.E.2d 212 (1963); First National Bank 
of Boston v. Chantton, 281 Mass. 72, 183 N.E. 250 (1932); Atkinson, Wills 734 (2d 
ed. 1953). 
S 343 Mass. 145, 177 N.E.2d 676 (1961), 1962 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §2.1. 
4349 Mass. 773, 211 N.E.2d 340 (1965). 
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§2.2 TRUSTS AND ESTATES 21 
to be specific on the reasoning of the Court with the special emphasis 
on the odd number involved. 
If a round number of shares such as 100 or 1000 is substituted, classi-
fication of the legacy may become more difficult. Suppose a testator, 
owning 100 shares of X Company stock when the will is executed, 
bequeaths X Company stock to four different legatees in shares of the 
following numbers: 25,27,43, and 5. Since the shares bequeathed cor-
respond exactly with the number owned, there is a strong inference 
that the testator had knowledge of and intended to dispose of the 
specific shares of X Company stock. On the other hand, this inference 
would be substantially weaker or would not arise if the testator owned 
only 100 shares of X Company stock and his will left 100 shares of X 
Company stock, 100 shares of Y Company stock, and 100 shares of Z 
Company stock to the same or to three separate legatees. 
If a testator owned only 100 shares of X Company stock and left 
100 shares of X Company stock to one legatee and the residue of his 
estate to another, classification of the bequest becomes more complex 
because of the round number involved. It may well be that the law's 
preference for a construction that a legacy is general may control.1) 
But, since the reason for the tendency of the law to favor general over 
specific bequests is to avoid the harsh consequences of ademption by 
extinction,6 cases (like Igoe and Lavin) involving the question whether 
additional shares following a stock split-up should pass to a legatee 
may call for a different judicial attitude - one which this writer be-
lieves would lead to a result which would come closer to fulfilling 
the desires of the donor who makes such a testamentary gift.7 
§2.2. Construction of wills: Correction of defective expression. 
Courts understandably have a strong reluctance to correct defective 
expressions in wills. If, however, the will clearly and convincingly 
shows an intention to dispose of property in a particular manner, 
gaps in dispositive provisions may be supplied and inaccurate wording 
modified.1 The 1966 SURVEY year brought forth two cases in which the 
Supreme Judicial Court was called upon to imply testamentary gifts 
when the wills failed to provide specifically for the disposal of the 
estates in the circumstances which took place. In Boston Safe Deposit 
and Trust Co. v. Schmitt2 the testator bequeathed the entire estate in 
trust to pay the net income in specified portions to his son and two 
daughters. The son was to get his share of the principal on reaching 
the age of 30 years. The daughters' shares of income and principal 
were to be paid under different specified contingencies including a 
5 See Paulus, Special and General Legacies of Securities - Whither Testator's 
Intent,43 Iowa L. Rev. 467,469-470 (1958). 
6 Ibid. 
7 See also 1963 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §2.I. 
§2.2. 1 Sanger v. Bourke, 209 Mass. 481, 486, 95 N.E. 894, 895 (1911); Boston Safe 
Deposit and Trust Co. v. Coffin, 152 Mass. 95, 25 N.E. 30 (1890). 
2349 Mass. 669, 212 N.E.2d 202 (1965). 
4 
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gift over of a portion to the son or his issue and the other portion to 
the daughters' husbands if both daughters died in the lifetime of the 
testator without leaving issue surviving him. There was no provision 
for the disposition of the daughters' shares on the event that actually 
occurred - both having died without issue after the testator. 
The Court could see no clear dispositive pattern to pass the 
daughters' shares to the issue of the testator's son (the son having 
predeceased the daughters, leaving issue surviving them) and refused 
to imply a gift in their favor. In declining to find an end limitation 
for the sole benefit of the son and his issue the Court observed that 
on the express contingency of the daughters' death without issue be-
fore the testator, other persons than the son or his issue - the 
daughters' husbands, if any - would share a part of the estate. 
Since there was no ultimate gift over, intestacy resulted and the 
daughters' portions of the trust passed to the estates of .the three 
children. In concluding that the heirs were to be ascertained at the 
date of testator's death and not some later time, the Court relied on 
the rule of construction that a gift over to the heirs of the testator 
meant those who answered that description when the testator died.s 
A footnote4 pointed out that the recent Massachusetts statute5 chang-
ing the rule of construction was inapplicable because the will in ques-
tion was executed before the act became effective. In this aspect of the 
case the Court reached the right result based, however, on the wrong 
premise. The common law and statutory rules of interpretation are 
concerned only with an express limitation in favor of the donor's 
heirs and not with the fact of intestacy as in the principal case. An in-
testate decedent's heirs can be determined at no time other than the 
time of death. 
A gift by implication and a defective expression were found to exist 
in New England Merchants National Bank of Boston v. Mason.6 In 
this case, the will disposed of the residue of the estate in trust for ten 
years with income over the amount necessary to make specified cash 
payments to be accumulated. At the end of ten years this trust was to 
terminate, $1000 paid to two of the testator's children, and two new 
trusts in the amount of $15,000 each were to be created for the benefit 
of two daughters. Then followed a provision which gave all of the 
property " ... except said sums" for the two trusts for the benefit of 
the daughters to his son, George. The will stated that the testator 
provided for George most liberally because George had been closer to 
his father than any other member of the family. The $15,000 trust 
for one of the daughters gave her the income for life and upon her 
death the principal was to be paid over to the children of a named 
3 First Safe Deposit National Bank of New Bedford v. Westgate, 346 Mass. 444, 
193 N.E.2d 683 (1963), 1964 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §4.3. 
4349 Mass. 669, 674, 212 N.E.2d 202, 205 (1965). 
5 G.L., c. 184, §6A, inserted by Acts of 1964, c. 307, §l. See 1964 Ann. Surv. Mass. 
Law §4.7. 
61966 Mass. Adv. Sh. 251, 214 N.E.2d 39. 
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grand-daughter who were alive at the date of the daughter's death. 
No such children survived the daughter. 
The Court filled in the gap in the dispositive scheme by implying 
an end limitation in favor of George, emphasizing the testator's ex-
pression of special generosity to George and a general preference for 
a construction which would avoid intestacy. As a result, the gift of all 
of the property remaining at the end of the ten-year trust "except" the 
$15,000 trusts was treated as the equivalent of a gift "subject" to these 
trusts. The Court observed: "Our view ... carries the principle that· 
permits supplying testamentary defects by implication ... 'about as 
far as it ought to go, but still we think ... falls within the boundaries 
of construction' of this will where the scrivener obviously did not 
foresee all the possibilities."7 
§2.3. Construction of wills: Meaning of "heirs." A gift to the 
"heirs" of a designated person is ordinarily construed to be a gift to 
those who would inherit that person's property under the intestacy 
statute had he died intestate.! The statute of descent and distribution 
will not only identify the takers but their shares as well.2 By force 
of the statute a surviving spouse is made an "heir."3 
Context, however, may give the word "heirs" a different meaning 
such as "children" or "issue."4 First Agricultural National Bank of 
Berkshire County v. Shea5 considered the question whether the ordi-
nary rules of construction were to be rebutted by the specific wording 
of the limitation and the situation of the beneficiaries at the time the 
will was executed. The will created a trust for the benefit of the 
testator's wife and upon her death the trust estate was to be divided 
into six equal shares. Four sixths were left to the testator's living sister, 
or in the event of her death to be divided among her living children. 
Two sixths were to be divided between a deceased sister's two children, 
Ellen and James. The share of Ellen went to her absolutely but the 
share of James was to be held in trust by Ellen to pay the income to 
James for life and upon his death "the principal to go to his heirs 
excepting those by his first marriage." 
At the date of execution of the will, James had been married and 
divorced from his first wife and had a living daughter as the sole issue 
of this marriage. The testator's wife, who survived the testator, pre-
deceased James, and after her death James married again. James then 
7Id. at 255, 214 N.E.2d at 42. 
§2.3. 1 New England Trust Co. v. Watson, 330 Mass. 265, 267, 112 N.E.2d 799, 
800 (1953); Tyler v. City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 314 Mass. 528, 529, 50 N.E.2d 778, 
779 (1943); Seavey v. O'Brien, 307 Mass. 33, 35, 29 N.E.2d 196, 197 (1940). 
2 Seavey v. O'Brien, 307 Mass. 33, 29 N.E.2d 196, 197 (1:;40). 
3 Ibid. Sweeney v. Kennard, 331 Mass. 542 120 N.E.2d 910 (1954); Green v. Gil-
more, 331 Mass. 283, 118 N.E.2d 755 (1954). 
4 Richardson v. Warfield, 252 Mass. 518, 148 N.E. 141 (1925); Haley v. Boston, 
108 Mass. 576 (1871); Bowers v. Porter, 4 Pick. 198 (Mass. 1826). 
51966 Mass. Adv. Sh. 843, 217 N.E.2d 799. 
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died intestate survived by his widow and his daughter by his first mar-
riage. 
The Supreme Judicial Court rejected the contentions that the term 
"heirs" was synonymous with "children" or "issue" or that it meant 
heirs of the blood within the lineage of the testator's deceased sister. 
Applying the ordinary rule that the word "heirs" meant those persons 
who take the named ancestor's estate by inheritance after his death, the 
Court ruled that James' widow was entitled to the entire trust fund. 
The word "heirs" appeared once in the will and there were no further 
qualifications of its meaning other than in the clause in which it ap-
peared. When the testator made a substitutional gift to the children 
of his deceased daughter he identified them as such and not as her 
heirs or other ambiguous designation. 
In deciding that the widow of James was the sole taker of the trust 
fund, the Court reasoned that she was the sole heir within the mean-
ing of the will. Under the statute of descent the heirs of James were 
his widow and his daughter by his first marriage. Since the daughter 
was within the express exclusion of his heirs by his first marriage, the 
widow was the only remaining heir and was entitled to all. It should 
make no difference that the intestacy law would limit the widow's 
share to one third - the other two thirds would belong to the daughter 
- because the widow took under the will and not by intestacy. 
The gift was treated as though it was a gift to a class of heirs, of 
which there were two, and with the daughter excluded, the widow of 
James was the only person who answered that description.6 If the 
daughter of James had predeceased him and James had left an estate 
in excess of $25,000, it would appear that the widow would not have 
been the sole beneficiary but she would have had to share with the 
collateral heirs of James.7 However, in the Shea case, the daughter in 
fact had not predeceased James. There are cases in which persons 
expressly excluded from the designation of "heirs" in a will are treated 
as though they were dead in the ascertainment of the heirs of the 
named ancestor.8 The distinguishing feature, however, in most of 
these cases is that the excluded person is the sole heir at the time the 
heirs are to be ascertained, and unless the heirs are determined as 
if the excluded person were dead, the gift to the heirs would fail. 9 
§2.4. Revocation of probate decree: Self-dealing. The rule against 
self-dealing by trustees was the basis for a petition to reopen probate 
accounts in the case of Burlingham v. Worcester.1 The fiduciaries' ac-
counts showed a sale of one share and another sale of 25 shares of 
6 Ball v. Hopkins, 254 Mass. 347, 150 N.E. 434 (1926). 
7 G.L., c. 190, §§1·3. See Green v. Gilmore, 331 Mass. 283, 118 N.E.2d 755 (1954); 
Seavey v. O'Brien, 307 Mass. 33, 29 N.E.2d 196 (1940). 
8 Minot v. Harris, 132 Mass. 528 (1882). 
9 See 3 Restatement of Property §305, Comment v (1940); Casner, Gifts to Heirs, 
53 Harv. L. Rev. 207, 227, 228 (1939). 
§2.4. 11966 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1067, 218 N.E.2d 123. 
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stock of a closely held corporation which made up part of the res of a 
testamentary trust. The names of the purchasers of these shares were 
not listed. Twenty-one years after the accounts were duly allowed a 
petition was brought to revoke the decree of allowance on the ground 
of fraud. 
The petitioner contended that the alleged fraud consisted of the 
co-fiduciaries' failure to reveal that one of them was the purchaser of 
the single share and that the closely held corporation, in which the 
other fiduciary held several shares of stock, was the buyer of the 25 
shares. Thus, it was argued, a trustee violates the rule against self-
dealing when he purchases trust property for himself and when he sells 
trust property to a corporation in which he has several shares. 
The Supreme Judicial Court recognized that the sale of the single 
share had, on its face, the appearance of prohibited self-dealing. The 
circumstances of the case, however, led it to the conclusion that the 
transaction fell short of proving the fraud necessary to vacate the 
decree of allowance. The evidence disclosed that the purpose of the 
sale to a co-trustee was to qualify him to become a director of the 
closely held company and to thereby secure representation of the testa-
mentary trust which owned more than one fifth of the company's 
stock. The transaction was found to be fair and, in fact, beneficial to 
the trust. 
The question of fraud with respect to the sale of the 25 shares was 
dismissed with the observation: "The mere sale by trustees of stock 
to a company in which the trustees also hold some shares individually 
is not, without more, a basis for finding that the sale amounted to 
self-dealing by the trustee."2 The Court did not indicate the per-
centage of ownership the trustee's individually-owned "several shares" 
represented. If a trustee sells trust property to a corporation in which 
he owns a "substantial" part of the stock, there is an apparent breach 
of trust.3 In the ordinary case involving the question of whether there 
is a breach of a trustee's duty of loyalty through self-dealing, the 
burden rests on the trustee to show that he did not gain an advantage 
at the expense of the trust.4 In the principal case, however, the ques-
tion before the Court was whether a probate decree, entered more than 
21 years previously, should be vacated. Because of the strong policy 
favoring the finality of decrees rendered after notice to all interested 
parties,!; the burden of proving the fraud required for the revocation 
of the decree should rest with the petitioner.6 
2Id. at 1070,218 N.E.2d at 126. 
32 Scott, Trusts §170.l0 (2d ed.l956). See Ball v. Hopkins, 268 Mass. 260, 167 N.E. 
338 (1929). 
42 Scott, Trusts §170.l (2d ed.l956). 
5 See 1961 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §2.5; 1959 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §12.2. 
6 The Supreme Judicial Court observed that "[i]n light of [the petitioner's] avid 
and persistent interest in whatever disposition was made of [the stock of the closely 
held corporation], it is reasonable to conclude that such an examination was made 
that the petitioner became aware of [the trustee's] purchase long before these pe-
tions were brought." 1966 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1067, 1071, 218 N.E.2d 123. 126. 
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§2.5. Trusts: Trustee's discretion to invade principal. In Holyoke 
National Bank v. Wilson1 a testator's will, after bequeathing $10,000 
to his wife, left the residue of his estate to his wife and a bank as co-
trustees in trust to pay the net income to his wife for life with re-
mainders over to his nephew and nieces or their issue in specified 
shares. The will further provided: 2 
In case the net income from the trust fund shall be insufficient 
in the opinion of the trustees, at any time during the lifetime of 
my said wife for her comfort, maintenance and support, or for 
her care in an emergency, to payout from time to time from the 
principal of the trust fund such amounts as in their sole discre-
tion they may deem just and reasonable for such purposes. 
Four accounts of the trustees showing payments of $27,000 of trust 
principal in addition to $24,000 of income to the testator's widow were 
challenged. During the period covered by the disputed accounts the 
testator's wife owned separate property of the value of $148,000 from 
which she received an annual income approximating $20,000. 
Before any payments of principal were made, the testator's wife 
would submit a requisition form setting forth her itemized living 
expenses. She would then deduct the trust income received by her for 
the accounting period and request that the difference be paid to her 
from the trust principal. A trust officer of the co-trustee bank would 
examine the items in the requisition before any principal would be 
paid, but he never found occasion to reduce or change the listed items 
and always paid out the sums requested without taking into account 
the widow's separate property and income therefrom. 
The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the lower court's finding that 
there was no abuse of discretion in the payments out of principal 
in the amounts requested by the wife. The bank as trustee invaded 
principal for the benefit of the wife after a responsible consideration 
of the items in the requisition form. It was not necessary for the 
trustee to take into consideration the widow's separate resources. Al-
though the power to invade principal was limited by an objective 
standard relating to comfort, maintenance and support,S the Court 
observed that the language of the will unequivocally manifested an 
intention that these living expenses be borne exclusively by the trust 
income and principal. The will made an absolute gift of support and 
maintenance by way of a charge on income and principal of the trust. 
The Court also stated: "Viewing the evidence in its entirety we think that [the 
co·trustees] acted 'fairly, openly and in good faith', and that the respondents met 
the burden of proving that 'no advantage ... [was] taken of the parties beneficially 
interested, by misrepresentation or concealment of any important fact .... " Id. at 
1071, 218 N.E.2d at 126. 
§2.5. 11966 Mass. Adv. Sh. 205, 214 N.E.2d 42. 
2Id. at 206, 214 N.E.2d at 44. 
3 Lumpert v. Fisher, 245 Mass. 190, 139 N.E. 446 (1923). State Street Bank and 
Trust Co. v. United States, 313 F.2d 29 (Ist Cir. 1963), affirming 207 F. Supp. 955 
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If, however, a trust provides for the payment of income coupled 
with a provision empowering the invasion of principal in case of 
"need," a substantial difference from the limitation of the principal 
case is present. There is no indication that the burden of support is to 
rest solely upon the trust fund. To the contrary, to satisfy the "need" 
of the beneficiary, his private resources must be considered before it 
can be determined whether such need exists.4 
Even if the language were not as clear as that of the Wilson case in 
burdening the trust estate exclusively for the support of the bene-
ficiary, there appears to be a tendency on the part of the courts to in-
fer that the donor intended that support payments be made from the 
trust although the beneficiary has sufficient wealth of his own.5 
§2.6. Revocable trust: Income tax. A settlor of a revocable inter 
vivos trust is treated as the owner of the subject matter of the trust 
for federal income, estate, and gift tax purposes.1 Trust income is 
included in his gross income as ordinary income; and capital gains 
realized by the trust are attributable to him as gains. It makes no 
difference that under the terms of the trust the trust income and prin-
cipal are distributed or distributable to some one other than the 
grantor. Since the settlor is treated as though he were the owner of 
the trust res, net capital gains realized by the trust may be offset by 
capital losses resulting from sales of the settlor's individually owned 
assets. 
Dexter v. State Tax Commission2 held that under the Massachusetts 
income tax statutes capital losses incurred by the grantor of a revocable 
trust could not offset capital gains realized by the sale of trust prop-
erty, when the grantor and the trustees were inhabitants of the Com-
monwealth. The explicit terms of the statute require that income 
received by a Massachusetts resident be assessed to the trust.s Since 
the statute fails to provide for a deduction of losses incurred by a 
settlor or beneficiary from trust gains, the Court refused to read it 
into the legislation. 
(D. Mass. 1962); Pittsfield National Bank v. United States, 181 F. Supp. 851 (D. 
Mass. 1960). 
4 The beneficiary's own wealth had to be taken into account in the following 
cases: Lumpert v. Fisher, 245 Mass. 190, 139 N.E. 446 (1923) (life tenant given power 
to sell or mortgage "if necessary for her comfort, maintenance and support'); Cock-
ery v. Dorsey, 223 Mass. 97, 111 N.E. 795 (1916) (trustee "to pay over ... [principal] 
... when in the judgment of [trustee] the [beneficiary] is deserving and in need 
of aid."); Stevens v. Winship, 1 Pick. 317 (Mass. 1823), (power to invade "in case 
[beneficiary] shall stand in need ... for her comfortable support.'). 
5 Scott, Trusts §128.4, (2d ed. 1956); 1 Restatement of Trusts Second §128, Com-
ment e (1966); 1966 Mass. Adv. Sh. 205, 210, 214 N.E.2d 42, 46. Compare Copp v. 
Worcester County National Bank, 347 Mass. 548, 199 N.E.2d 200 (1964), and a dis-
cussion of it in the principal case. 
§2.6. 1 See Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§676, 677, 2038; U.S. Treas. Reg. §25.2511. 
2350 Mass. 380, 215 N.E.2d 94 (1966). 
S G.L., c. 62, §10. 
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Previous local cases have treated the interest of the settlor of a 
revo~able trust as the equivalent of outright ownership when comput-
ing the period of the rule against perpetuities4 and ascertaining the 
basis to determine gains or losses for income tax purposes.5 Moreover, 
two recent cases have applied the doctrine of constructive receipt to 
cause the income of an out-of-state trust to be taxed to the grantor, 
who resided in Massachusetts.6 These two cases were thought to be 
distinguishable in the Dexter case, in that a different section of the 
income tax statute is applicable when the trustees are not inhabitants 
of Massachusetts;7 since the state did not have jurisdiction to tax a 
nonresident trustee, the settlor of the revocable trust was deemed to 
have "received" the income of the trust because he could have ob-
tained it upon demand. The economic realities attending the power 
to recapture the trust property were thought to be controlling when 
a more restricted meaning of the word "received" would have created 
an opportunity for tax avoidance by stressing form over substance. 
When a Massachusetts trustee "receives" income from a trust created 
by a resident, the tax is explicitly assessed to the trust and no tax 
loophole is apparent from the statute's literal application. 
If the trustees of the trust in the Dexter case were non-inhabitants, 
the settlor would have constructively received the capital gains which, 
in turn, would have been offset by his losses. In answer to the tax-
payer's claim that the tax provisions, as construed by the Court, ad-
versely affect the Massachusetts settlor who selects a local trustee, the 
observation was made that the settlor could have exercised his power 
to revoke. If the taxpayer recaptured the trust assets after revocation 
and then subsequently sold them at a gain, the gain would have been 
reduced by the losses.8 
§2.7. Present interest trust for minor: Income tax. In State Tax 
Commission v. Loring1 and State Tax Commission v. Burr2 the Su-
preme Judicial Court was called upon to decide whether a beneficiary 
of a trust had an indefeasibly vested interest in order to resolve state 
income tax issues. In both cases Massachusetts inhabitants created 
irrevocable trusts with Massachusetts trustees for the benefit of desig-
nated minors. Under the terms of the trusts the trustee could expend 
so much of the income and principal for the benefit of the minor as 
the trustee might determine. When the minor reached the age of 21 
4 Second Bank-State St. Trust Co. v. Second Bank-State St. Trust Co., 335 Mass. 
407, 410, 140 N.E.2d 201, 205 (1957), 1957 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §12.7. 
5 Boston Safe Deposit and Trust Co. v. State Tax Commission, 346 Mass. 100, 
104-106, 190 N.E.2d 88, 91-93 (1963). 
6 Dewey v. State Tax Commission, 346 Mass. 43, 190 N.E.2d 203 (1963), 1963 Ann. 
Surv. Mass. Law §17.5; State Tax Commission v. Fitts, 340 Mass. 575, 165 N.E.2d 
586 (1960), 1960 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §17.5. 
7 G.L., c. 62, §11. 
8Id. §5. 
§2.7. 11966 Mass. Adv. Sh. 667, 215 N.E.2d 751. 
21966 Mass. Adv. Sh. 613, 215 N.E.2d 755. 
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the trust fund was to be paid to the minor free of the trust. If the 
minor died under the age of 21, the trustee was to pay over the trust 
property as the minor might appoint by will, and, in default of ap-
pointment, to the minor's estate. 
In both cases, the trustees added items of taxable income to trust 
corpus. In the Loring case the minor-beneficiary was a resident of Cali-
fornia. If he had the sole beneficial interest in the trust, the income 
would not be taxable under the Massachusetts income tax laws.3 In 
the Burr case the minor-beneficiary was a resident of Massachusetts 
and the trustee could claim a $2000 exemption in behalf of the minor 
if the beneficiary's interest was indefeasibly vested.4 The Court ruled 
that the beneficiaries of both trusts had the sole beneficial interests-
that the minors had vested interests not subject to divestment - with 
the result that the income was not taxable in Loring and the $2000 
exemption was available in Burr. 
The trusts were obviously drafted to take advantage of the $3000 
annual exclusion for federal gift tax purposes.5 The trust terms closely 
followed the formula of Section 2503(c) of the Internal Revenue Code 
of 1954 so as to create a present interest in the minor. The Court 
thought that the accomplishment of this identifiable tax objective was 
an aid in the interpretation of the trust instrument. 
The minor's interest was not subject to defeasance. The trust limita-
tion recited all of the consequences that attach to an indefeasibly 
vested interest if the beneficiary died intestate before attaining the 
age of 21, the trust fund would pass to his heirs and if he died testate, 
it would pass to his legatees. 
Under the Treasury Regulations a present interest trust for the 
benefit of a minor can be created even though there is an express gift 
in default of appointment to someone other than the estate of the 
minor under the formula of Section 2503(c) of the Internal Revenue 
Code.6 It would appear that if there were such a taker in default in 
the trusts before the Court in Loring and Burr, the beneficiaries' in-
terests would have been "uncertain" and "subject to be divested" and 
both cases would have been decided differently. 
§2.8. Legislation: Allocation of stock dividends. In Old Colony 
Trust Co. v. Aymar1 the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey, pur-
suant to an order of the Securities Exchange Commission, distributed 
among its shareholders stock of the Consolidated Natural Gas Com-
pany. Since there was no impairment of capital, the distribution was 
not deemed to be one in partial liquidation, and the Supreme Judicial 
Court applied the ordinary rule of trust accounting: a distribution by 
a corporation of stock of another corporation is allocated to income 
3 G.L., c. 62, §10. 
4Id. §§8(a), 5, 12. 
5 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §2503. 
6 U.S. Treas. Reg. §25.2503(c). 
§2.8. 1317 Mass. 66, 56 N.E.2d 889 (1944). 
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unless the terms of the trust provide otherwise.2 Because of this prece-
dent and in anticipation of a distribution of General Motors stock by 
Du Pont under a divestiture decree,3 the Massachusetts Legislature 
enacted Chapter 481 of the Acts of 1962.4 Since DuPont stock is a 
widely held trust investment and since an allocation of General Motors 
stock to trust income would lead to a substantial impairment of trust 
principal, the objective of this statute was to remove the threatened 
inequitable effect upon the remaindermen. 
The 1962 statute, after reciting the ordinary rule that distributions 
of securities of corporations other than those of the declaring corpora-
tion shall be treated as income, goes on to provide: 
If a trustee, not including a trustee who is a settlor or' bene-
ficiary of the trust, determines that this section would be unjust 
or inequitable in its affect upon the income beneficiaries, or the 
remaindermen, or both, the trustee may treat such distribution in 
whole or in part as income or principal in such a manner and in 
such proportions as the trustee deems just and equitable. 
Except for a somewhat similar statute in Connecticut,5 the Massachu-
setts statute was substantially different from those of other states which 
attempted to resolve the trust accounting problem.6 Unanticipated 
adverse consequences have arisen in its application. Since the act calls 
for an exercise of discretion by the trustee on the basis of a standard 
of what would be "unjust or inequitable" vis-a-vis income beneficiaries 
and remaindermen, judges in proceedings involving the allowance of 
trust accounts have required introduction of evidence as to the size 
and nature of the trust fund, the identity, needs, and personalities of 
the beneficiaries, and all other circumstances attending the exercise 
of the trustee's discretion to depart from the ordinary rule of trust 
accounting. 
The statute appeared to have another obvious defect. In limiting 
the exercise of the discretion to allocate to trustees other than the 
settlor or a beneficiary, the Legislature attempted to avoid possible 
adverse tax consequences to the settlor or the beneficiary.7 This, how-
ever, left the trust accounting in equity as it was if a beneficiary or the 
settlor was a trustee. 
Chapter 465 of the Acts of 1966 repealed the 1962 statute and sub-
stituted the following: 
Unless otherwise provided by a will or other instrument by 
which a trust is created, distributions to a trustee by a corporation 
23 Scott, Trusts §235.5 (2d ed. 1956). 
3 United States v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours and Co., 366 U.S. 316, 81 Sup. Ct. 1243, 
6 L. Ed. 2d 318 (1961). 
4 G.L., c. 203, §21A. 
5 Conn. Gen. Stat. §§45-113 (1958), as amended by Laws of 1959, c. 110. 
6 See 3 Scott, Trusts §235.5 (2d ed. 1956, Supp. 1966). 
7 See Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§674(a), 674(c), 2036, 2038; State Street Trust Co. v. 
United States, 263 F.2d. 635 (1st Cir. 1959). 
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or unincorporated association of shares or other seCUrItIes or 
obligations of corporations or unincorporated associations other 
than the one making the distributions shall be treated as income; 
provided, however, that to the extent that the trustee, acting as 
a prudent man would do in the management of investments, 
determines that any such distribution is essentially principal of the 
trust, the distribution shall be as principal. 
A "prudent man" standard for trust accounting, although new, may 
be analogized to the prudent man rule of trust investments which 
has worked so well. However, it took a long period for the courts to 
refine the investment rule and its corollaries, and it is possible that 
much judicial gloss may be required before a new prudent man rule 
for the allocation of corporate distributions may be confidently ap-
plied by trustees. Delaware, the other jurisdiction which has adopted 
a similar statutory approach, has specified some of the circumstances 
the trustee may consider in making his determination how men of 
prudence manage their own affairs with respect to allocation of such 
stock distributions.8 
The majority of states enacting legislation to cover the stock spin-off 
directed by public authority adopt the mandatory rule of the Revised 
Uniform Principal and Income Act that the shares of the non-declar-
ing corporation be added to trust principal. The rules of the Uniform 
Act have the merit of simplicity of application and specificity on mat-
ters left open in the new Massachusetts statute. Under the Uniform 
Act, there is a provision expressly stating that a corporate distribution 
is principal if made pursuant to a call of shares or a merger, reorgani-
zation or other plan by which assets of the corporation are acquired 
by another corporation. It may be that an exchange of shares for assets 
on merger or reorganization is not a distribution within the meaning 
of the new Massachusetts statute and the prudent man rule would 
therefore be inapplicable. If the act does include such exchange within 
the meaning of distributions, it would still appear that "prudent" 
management of such investments would call for allocation of the new 
shares to principal. However, the certainty of the Revised Uniform 
Act seems preferable.9 
8 Del. Code Ann., tit. 12, §3526 (1953), as inserted by Laws of 1959, c. 121. 
9 See Note, Trust Allocations of Dividends In Securities of Non-declaring Cor-
porations - Massachusetts and New York, 43 B.U.L. Rev. 303 (1963). 
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